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Fair Value for the S&P500?
Jarrod Wilcox, November 15, 2002
The record of those who seek to get in and out of the stock market
at the right times is as dismal today as it
was in the wild days before the formation of modern stock exchanges.
Undismayed, I recently tried to look at the market with a
fresh eye, to see whether the outlandish valuations of the recent
stock market bubble had gotten back into "fair value" range.
The result surprised
me.
If we mean by fair value that the US stock market reflects
the underlying economic realities of today, the answer is yes.
We can stop worrying about getting soaked in the collapse of the
soap bubble of unrealistic investor optimism. Now we sporting
types can bet on whether the bottom has been reached in US company
profitability. Or maybe on the impact of a weak US dollar on
interest rates. And we can spend less time worrying about the
bubble's aftermath in terms of falling investor confidence.
My favorite tool for this kind of investigation is the
PB-ROE model. You'll see why when you see how convincing it is in
explaining both the recent bull market and the subsequent climb down
over the last couple of years. Let's take a look at
what it is, and then show the results in a couple of very
illuminating charts.
What you need to get the most from this
article:
Accounting Terms:
Equity Book Value -- The ownership equity originally put into the company
plus the accumulated retained earnings.
Return on Equity (ROE) -- Net income divided by equity book value
per share.
Market Terms:
S&P 500 Index -- A price index maintained by Standard &
Poor's that tracks the combined movement of prices of 500 large
US public companies.
Price-to-book ratio (PB) -- Price per stock share divided by equity book value.
AAA Interest -- Current interest rate on high quality bonds as rated by Moody's.
Valuation Model:
Any "normal" relationship between fundamental economic or accounting variables,
prices of other securities, and the price of the security being modeled.
The PB-ROE model is a normal relationship of PB to ROE and
a comparable interest rate.
OLS Multiple Regression:
This stands for ordinary least squares multiple regression, a statistical technique for establishing
a prediction of a dependent variable based on one or more independent
variables.
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The basic idea behind PB-ROE is that company equity ownership is
capitalized as the compound result of the difference between return
on equity and a comparable interest rate. That is, take the
viewpoint that the investor is buying a partner's share in the
ownership equity already put into the company. It is worth
more if the company's return on that capital is higher. It is
worth less if the investor could get a good return on a bond from a
similar company. The form of this relationship has to
recognize that any excess profits will be compounded, resulting in
exponential growth. It is the logarithm of PB that
should relate most simply to ROE and bond interest rates. (To learn
more about PB-ROE, click here.)
How much of the great bull and bear markets we have just been
through can the PB-ROE model explain? If it can explain much,
can we learn anything more from deviations of actual price-to-book
ratios from it? To check this out, I looked at a history of profitability of the S&P 500 index,
measured as return on equity as compared to AAA 10 year bond
interest rates. (Data sources: BARRA and St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank.) The data are
over 300 monthly observations through October 2002.
What the chart below shows is a dramatic variation over the last
two decades in the gap between profitability and its bond interest
competition. The gap almost closed in the early 1980's, only
to grow wider and wider, reaching a peak in 1999. During
this period, interest rates came down. (Much of this, though
by no means all, was based on the reduction of high monetary
inflation.) At the same time, though it fluctuated with the
business cycle, profitability not only held up but grew! The
increased profitability remains rather under-explained, although we
now know some of it was based on optimistic accounting.
Nevertheless, the PB-ROE model should predict a strongly rising
stock market during this period.
For the most recent two years, the pattern has been quite
different. Profitability has fallen sharply, although it still
remains not far from the average experienced over the last two
decades. Interest rates have fallen slightly, but nowhere near
enough to make up for the drop in ROE. The PB-ROE model would
therefore expect a decline in the market's price-to-book ratio, and
since book value moves only slowly, a negative return for the S&P
500.

Now let's take a look at actual PB (the yellow circles in the
chart that follows). Sure enough, the peak in the market's
capitalization relative to ownership equity actually invested in the
500 companies within the S&P 500 list came at the same time as the
peak in profitability. A straight line best fit between log PB
and the difference ROE-AAA would tell much the same story, but a
slightly better fit can be gotten by allowing the sensitivities to
ROE and AAA to be different. This OLS multiple regression technique allows us to reflect the possibility that
ROE differences are discounted for uncertainty or that we have measured a bond rate whose duration is different than the
investment horizon. The result gives us a simple "in-sample" explanation
of PB, plotted as red triangles in the chart below.

A statistics expert would point to problems in the chart above.
The worst is something called autocorrelation of residuals. It means either that I have left out additional
explanatory variables or that the whole model's fit is more or less
a coincidence. I choose to believe the former. Another
problem is the lack of fit around and before 1980. I suspect
this has to do with a spike in inflation during that period, with
current ROE being suspect based on accounting difficulties in
matching today's revenues with older depreciation expenses
denominated in dollars of lesser value.
What is the conclusion one might draw from the chart?
First, to me, it appears
as though most of the variation in pricing levels has been
an expression of changes in the underlying fundamentals rather than in investor psychology.
The "bubble" was more a bubble in profits relative to cheap interest
rates than in speculative fever by day-traders. Second,
however, if we accept the model, the persistent more moderate
differences from it are meaningful. They may well be due to market psychology --
the periods of
investor overconfidence that we tend to mean when we talk about a "bubble."
This helps us distinguish between a bubble as irrational
exuberance and a bubble in the underlying fundamentals. Third, when we look
at the chart at the end of October 2002, it looks like the market is
near fair value based on current fundamentals.
In other words, I can stop paying so much attention to what is
happening to investor confidence -- that part of the bubble bursting
appears over.
One less thing to worry about. There are more aspects to
consider -- whether company profitability will
decline further as the result of economic recession or whether
international investors have slowed the lending to the US which has
helped keep interest rates here low. But at least I know where
to focus my attention.
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