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1
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2
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- Irrational exuberance?
- Exaggerated accounting profits?
- Temporary high profitability?
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3
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- The momentum gets rolling:
- Jeremy Siegel (1994) – “increasing recognition by investors of the
superior past performance of equities.”
- Alan Greenspan (1996) -- “How do we know when irrational exuberance has
unduly escalated asset values….”
- David Dreman (1996) – There is an impressive and growing body of
evidence demonstrating that investors and speculators don’t necessarily
learn from experience.”
- Marty Zweig (1997) – “The major direction of the market is dominated by
Federal Reserve policy and the movement of interest rates….” “Never
fight the tape.”
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4
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- Momentum tops out:
- Jeremy Siegel (1999) – JPM article “The Shrinking Equity Premium.”
- Elaine Garzarelli (2000) – predicts Dow 12500 in 6 months because of
loosening of interest rates by the Federal Reserve.
- Ed Yardeni (2000) – “[Dow] 15000 by 2005 looks like a fairly
unambitious forecast at this point.”
- Byron Wien (2000) – “there is too much complacency. People say they are worried, but
nobody is doing anything about it.”
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5
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- After some decline:
- Jeremy Siegel (2001) -- “I think we can think of March and April as the
bottom.” With interest rates going down, I wonder where investors are
really going to put their money.”
- The Motley Fool (2001) – “We’re going to buck up in the hopes that 2002
will certainly be better.”
- Abby Cohen (Jan 2002) – “The bear market is over for all intents and
purposes.”
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6
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- After more decline:
- Warren Buffett (2002) – “If there is a special place in hell they’re
saving for anyone, I think they ought to use it up on the people that
really got very rich and all their investors have their savings wiped
out.”
- Barton Biggs (2002) -- “My guess is that the bearishness and selling
have been somewhat overdone.”
- David Dreman (2002) – “I think we’ve come out of the worst bubble in
history, including the classic ones that have been written about like
the tulip mania.
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7
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- Not just an inability to forecast…
- But valuation models that are too simplistic (normal p/e, some EVA),
- Or with uncertain, unmeasurable ingredients (most DDM’s),
- Or too detailed to estimate with available data (some EVA and CFROI
models?),
- Leaving enormous uncertainty as to how much of price moves are based on
market psychology and deceptive profit reporting.
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8
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9
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- For control
- When we just need to know cause and effect
- Application: government, corporate policy
- For prediction
- To separate causes you can predict from those you can not predict
- Application: research focus
- To identify residuals that have predictive value for returns
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10
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- I used it in the late 1970’s as a management consulting tool for
companies interested in improving their stock price. Developed derivation only after
noticing occasional linear relationships between P/B and ROE.
- 1984 FAJ article proposed PB-ROE as a means of focusing investment
research.
- From early 1990’s used by several investment firms to exploit negative
autocorrelation in cross-sectional residuals as a stock or country
selection ingredient.
- This is my first effort to apply it to S&P500 time series. There is now enough available data.
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11
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12
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- Must get over thinking book value is less accurate than reported
earnings!
- R-Squared irrelevant, look at dispersion of pricing errors.
- Approximate linear relationship between PB and expected return on
equity. Instead, we measure
current and past ROE.
- Dividend, required return and investment horizon are additional
variables.
- PB-ROE models work best where range of complicating variables is tight:
- Required return based on risk characteristics and interest rate levels
- Investment horizon before return on equity reverts to mean
- Dividend policy
- Differences between current and expected ROE, as within an homogeneous
industry.
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13
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- For time-series use, note that required return changes dramatically with
inflation and real interest rates.
Also, we will not have an industry context to provide a
large-sample frame of reference.
- Derivation Documentation of PB-ROE:
- 1) At any point in time, k = ΔP/P + D/P
- Where k is required expected shareholder return
- P is price, D is dividend
- 2) We can choose any measurable accounting entity, in this case B, book
value, to decompose ΔP. B
has better growth forecasting properties than does earnings.
- 3) ΔP = ΔB * (P/B) + B * Δ(P/B) + ΔB * Δ(P/B)
- The compound difference on the right will vanish as we go to a
differential equation form.
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14
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- Differential Equation from 1) & 3):
- 4) (P/B)(k-g) = d (P/B)/ dt + δ
- Where δ is D/B and g is expected growth in B
- Note expected return on equity is r = g + δ.
- Boundary Condition:
- 5) At a time horizon t=T, g + δ assumed to revert to a normal
value k, having been constant until that time, and P/B will have
reached a normal value N.
- Exact Solution:
- 6) P/B = [δ/(k-g)][1 - e(g-k)T] + N e(g-k)T
- Where e is the natural constant 2.718 ….
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15
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- In contrast to the Gordon model δ/(k-g), here we can express the
exponential on the left as an infinite Taylor series and divide out the
troublesome (k-g):
- 7) P/B = δ[T + (g-k)T2/2 + …] + Ne(g-k)T
- The functional relationship of P/B to δ + g, or r, is nearly the
same if we assume P/B at time T is N=1.
Expressing the right-hand exponential as a second Taylor series,
and combining:
- 8) P/B = 1 + (r-k)T + (r-k)(g-k)T2/2 + ….
- Again, if δ, or r-g, is small, step 8) approximates the Taylor
series for:
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16
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- Unlike past earnings growth as a measure of expected earnings growth,
accounting ROE is a fair indicator of future ROE and thus of r. Consequently …
- The slope of a cross-sectional regression line between log P/B and ROE
can be used as a measure of typical time horizon T.
- Horizontal scatter from this best fit line can tell us about specific
ROE-r.
- Differences in the intercept may tell us something about changes in
required shareholder return k.
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17
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- Data Sources
- Barra: S&P500 monthly total returns, S&P500 monthly P/B,
cap-weighted E/P, cap-weighted B/P, cap-weighted ROE, where net income
E and ROE are based on 12 month net income before extraordinary items.
- St. Louis Federal Reserve: 12-month CPI inflation rate, seasonally
adjusted, Moody’s seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield.
- Value Line Database: individual stock pricing and fundamental data.
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18
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19
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- Given PB-ROE’s assumptions, increasing disparity of individual company
expected ROE’s …
- Will increase the market value of the aggregate,
- Even though there is no change in aggregate income or aggregate book
value.
- The appropriate aggregate ROE estimate is intermediate between
capitalization-weighted and book-weighted ROE averages.
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20
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21
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22
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23
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24
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- Same Variables on Both Sides
- Book value in P/B, ROE.
- Some change in P/B implied in EstROE weighting. Really need iterative model.
- Autocorrelation of Residuals
- Inevitable for an irrational bubble, but sign of missing variables.
- Multicollinearity between inflation and real interest.
- PB-ROE applied to time-series market valuation:
- Useful measures of statistical significance and confidence intervals
require non-parametric methods.
- Absent these, estimated model structure requires strong prior if used
to guide research.
- Expanding window residuals can be rigorously tested as return
predictors. EstROE is superior
to book-weighted ROE.
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25
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26
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27
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28
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29
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30
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31
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- The PB-ROE valuation model can be successfully used to better understand
market valuation time-series for use both in regulation and investment
research focus.
- For market-timers, even when all forward-looking information is removed,
it has a modest monthly predictive power.
- Comparisons with the various “Fed” models are welcomed.
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32
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- Most of the “bubble” can be explained by fundamentals of GAAP reported
ROE (before true extraordinary items), interest rate and inflation
rates. The big bubble may lie in
a cycle of unsustainable reported profits, as well as temporary extremes
of profit inequality.
- However, superimposed were:
- A long-term upward trend in valuation that may have been based on
declining risk or lower effective taxation, possibly through use of
pension funds and 401K plans.
- Unexplained aggregate excess pricing on the order of 35% from 1999
through mid-2002. Overall excess
pricing during a period of decline was striking. It is this part that seems a market
psychology, or speculative, bubble.
- As of early 2003, there is no longer significant evidence of speculative
over-valuation or under-valuation relative to GAAP reporting and current
interest rates and inflation.
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